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The incentives that ﬁrms have to merge have recently been studied in non-cooperative
games of endogenous coalition formation. The usual way of analyzing these games is by
assuming that the forming of a coalition or the negotiation of a merger has no cost for the
participants, in particular, many players may consider simultaneously whether to form a
coalition or not. However, the decision to join in a single coalition involves negotiations
or, for instance, the need to co-ordinate the productive technologies of the diﬀerent ﬁrms.
There are, therefore, transaction costs. Moreover, the transaction costs seem much higher
the more ﬁrms that are involved in a single merger.1
For this reason, we consider relevant to study the opposite case: what happens when
the merger process is carried out always bilaterally? With this we mean that, at any point
in time, only two of the existing coalitions may decide to merge. Although we do not
explicitly model transaction costs, this restriction could be understood as the outcome
of situations in which there is a very important scale-eﬀect in transaction costs (i.e., a
merger that involves three or more coalitions would imply bearing so many transaction
costs that it becomes unfeasible). The restriction we impose does not mean, however,
that only small coalitions may be formed. By sequentially meeting over time, coalitions
may grow in size. In other words, once some coalitions are formed, they may decide to
continue with the process and form even larger entities.
The sector of ﬁrms that provide professional services (accounting, consulting, etc.)
oﬀers a relevant set of examples of such a sequential process of bilateral mergers. Some of
the major ﬁrms in this sector, (i.e., Ernst & Young, KPGM and PricewaterhouseCoopers)
are the outcome of a sequential process of mergers with a small number of parties involved.
In particular, since Arthur Young opened an accounting ﬁrm in Chicago (1894), and the
brothers Alvin and Theodore Ernst settled their ﬁrm in Cleveland (1903), at least four
bilateral mergers have taken place before the present structure of Ernst and Young was
arrived at.
1The cost of integrating more than two organizations is very large. This is the reason why most
mergers involve only two ﬁrms. For example, Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) construct a sample









The banking sector provides other examples. In Spain, the bank that is now known as
SCH is the outcome of a merger between the Banco de Santander and the Banco Central
Hispano which, in turn, was the result of the merger between the banks Central and
Hispano. Similarly, the banks of Bilbao and Vizcaya ﬁrst merged to form the BBV and
then the new ﬁrm merged again with the Banco Argentaria to form the BBVA.
We model the formation of coalitions as a sequential process in which, at each moment
in time, only two existing coalitions can decide to merge. We study the subgame perfect
equilibria of such a game. The sequential process of coalition formation that we propose
can be useful in analyzing sequential formation of bilateral agreements in several economic
environments where groups of agents interact, including mergers, environmental cartels,
and networks.
In this paper, we consider a market in which identical ﬁrms with constant returns
facing linear demand compete à la Cournot. At each period, the ﬁr m sm a k ed e c i s i o n s
on quantity. To focus our analysis on the incentives to form coalitions, we assume that
production is a short-term decision. Also, at each period, two randomly chosen coalitions
can merge in the existing partition. A merger means forming a cartel in which the partners
decide on production jointly. The decision on the merger is made by taking the long-term
proﬁts into account.
A sS a l a n t ,S w i t z e r ,a n dR e y n o l d s( 1 9 8 3 )p o i n to u t ,t w oﬁrms (or coalitions) will not
be interested in merging if they only consider the present period proﬁts and if there are
already at least three ﬁrms (coalitions) in the industry. Their result extends easily to our
model: If the ﬁrms’ discount rate is low enough, they will not merge at any period in the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Hence, the outcome is that all of the
ﬁrms remain singletons.
The situation when ﬁrms are forward-looking is more interesting. In such a case, the
ﬁrms may want to merge even if they lose proﬁts in the short run. In fact, we show
that when ﬁrms are patient enough, and there are enough ﬁrms in the industry, the
ﬁnal outcome of any subgame perfect equilibria is “the grand coalition”. The ﬁrms form
coalitions sequentially, growing gradually, so that ﬁnally they all end up together. We
characterize the sequences of mergers that the ﬁrms will undertake in equilibrium. In









Moreover, the characteristics of our game allow us to analyze all of the subgame perfect
equilibria, without restricting our attention to stationary strategies as it is usual in the
literature. All the results remain true if we concentrate on the stationary subgame perfect
equilibria of our coalition formation game.
The fact that, in a linear Cournot model, “the grand coalition” can result as the
equilibrium of a game of coalition formation, is in contrast with other results on mergers
presented in the literature. Several authors have addressed the question of the coalition
structures that would prevail in this set up by analyzing the stability of the coalition
structures.2 This literature suggests that there would eventually be one large coalition
and a few players as singletons. Our game never has these intermediate results: If there
is a small number of players, or if the discount rate is low, all of the players remain as
singletons, while “the grand coalition” is the only ﬁnal outcome when both the set of
players and the discount rate are large enough. In fact, “all singletons” and “the grand
coalition” are the only two possible subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our game.
The diﬃculty to reach eﬃcient outcomes through non-cooperative games of coalition
formation has been discussed in diﬀerent games. Kamien and Zang (1990) show that a
merger can not involve many ﬁrms when the number of players is large using a model of
coalition formation via acquisitions. This is also the case in Bloch (1996) and Ray and
Vohra (1999) for a sequential game of coalition formation.3 Ray and Vohra (1997) ﬁnd
an analogous result for a larger class of games using the notion of equilibrium binding
agreements based on farsightedness. Diamantoudi and Xue (2002) prove that this negative
result may still arise when arbitrary coalitional deviations are allowed. However, for
2In simultaneous games, we can refer to four stability concepts (Aumann (1967) and Hart and Kurtz
(1983)). A coalition structure is α-stable if no group of ﬁrms can guarantee an improvement, indepen-
dently of what the others do. A partition is β-stable if no group of ﬁrms has, for any possible reaction of
the external players, a strategy that can improve its situation. A coalition structure is γ-stable (respec-
tively, δ-stable) if no set of players has incentives to deviate when the players of their original coalitions
split up (respectively, they still form a coalition). In the linear Cournot game, α-stable, β-stable, and
γ-stable outcomes always have the form {s,1,...,1} with s being higher or equal to 80% of the market.
The set of δ-stable outcomes, on the other hand, is empty.
3Section 5 provides a more detailed comparison of the papers by Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra










symmetric games like ours, the grand coalition is an stable outcome of their game.
Some authors have considered the sequential formation of mergers by studying how
these decisions are inter-connected over time. Pesendorfer (2004) studies a model of
merger formation with entry in the line of Kamien and Zang (1990), where certain ﬁrms
acquire others by submitting bids and asking prices. In his model, “the grand coalition”
cannot be formed in a single period, because all the ﬁrms are not present in the market
from the beginning of the game. He concludes that even if frequent mergers are not
proﬁtable when the number of ﬁrms in the industry is small, they can become proﬁtable
as the number of ﬁrms increases. Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) analyze the steady
states of an endogenous merger game, in which a dominant ﬁrm takes merger decisions
regarding a competitive fringe. They show that monopoly and perfect competition always
belong to the set of steady states in the game. In this paper, we have identiﬁed a strategic
eﬀect of mergers: I merge today because this may foster future mergers,t h a tr e m a i n e d
unnoticed and that may have some relation with merger waves.
Our work is also in line with Gul (1989), who analyzes a transferable utility economy
in which random bilateral meetings occur. At each meeting, one of the agents makes a
proposal to the other which he can either accept or reject. If the proposal is accepted,
the resources of both agents are in the hands of the proposer from this moment on,
otherwise, both players stay in the game. Gul (1989) shows that, under some conditions,
all the players will eventually end up together and the expected payoﬀ of each player in
an eﬃcient sequential perfect equilibrium is his Shapley value.4
In the following section we present the coalition-formation game. In Section 3, we
analyze the outcomes of the game when ﬁrms are myopic, while in Section 4 we do the
analysis when ﬁrms are forward looking. In Section 5, we show the extent to which our
results are robust to several variations of our game.
4Seidmann and Winter (1998) also analyze gradual coalition-formation in games without externalities,









2 The Coalition-Formation Game
We study the sequential formation of coalitions between ﬁrms competing à la Cournot
in a framework in which only bilateral agreements a r ea l l o w e d .W ea s s u m et h a t ,a te a c h
moment in time only two of the existing coalitions can decide to merge.
At the beginning of the game, there are n identical ﬁrms, with n ≥ 2. We denote the
set of ﬁrms by N = {1,...,n}. Firms can form coalitions following a certain protocol that
will be described later. Hence, at any point in time, these n ﬁrms form a partition of N,
i.e., they constitute a coalition structure.
Let
Q
denote the set of coalition structures over N. Denote π ∈
Q
an element of this
set, that is, π = {S1,...,S r},w i t hSa ⊂ N for all a =1 ,...,r, ∪r
a=1Sa = N, and Sa∩Sb = ∅
for all Sa,S b ∈ π,w i t hSa 6= Sb. W ed e n o t eb ysa the size of coalition Sa.A m o n g t h e
set of partitions, a particular coalition structure is the one in which all the agents are
alone, i.e., all the coalitions are singletons. We denote such a partition by πn and “the
grand coalition” by π1 ≡ N, i.e., the coalition structure with just one element. We denote
by (π\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb}, the coalition structure that results when we replace two
elements of π, namely Sa and Sb, by their union. Therefore, if π is formed by r coalitions,
(π\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} consists of (r − 1) coalitions.
Firms make decisions at any time t =0 ,1,2,....A t t i m e t, the present proﬁts of a
ﬁrm depend on the whole coalition structure that is formed at that time. We assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that ﬁrms face a linear demand function and bear equal constant








The production costs of ﬁrm i are given by:
Ci(qi)=cqi.
When ﬁrms merge, they form a cartel. That is, merging allows the ﬁrms to co-ordinate
their quantity decisions. We calculate the ﬁrms’ proﬁts at any point in time, given a cartel









short-term decision, being taken by short-term managers.5 Given that there are r cartels
in this structure and that marginal costs are equal for all ﬁrms in a cartel, cartel Sa













From this program we ﬁnd that the equilibrium quantities are equal for all of the cartels
and that they are equal to: qr = α−c
β(r+1). Hence, the Cournot proﬁts per-cartel V r in a




β(r +1 ) 2.
We normalize
(α−c)2




(r +1 ) 2.
It can be easily veriﬁed that the eﬃcient outcome, from the industry’s point of view, is
arrived at when all the ﬁrms merge, and “the grand coalition” is formed.
We assume that the sharing of proﬁts among the ﬁrms that form the cartel is exoge-
nously ﬁxed and egalitarian. Therefore, the individual proﬁts Vi(π) of any ﬁrm i belonging




(r +1 ) 2sa
. (2)
Firms value future payoﬀs with a homogeneous discount factor δ ∈ [0,1). Therefore, if πt






5It is well known that, in an inﬁn i t eg a m el i k eo u r s ,t h e r ea r es t r a t e g i e sb yw h i c hﬁrms may reach
implicit collusion in production if the discount rate is high enough (notice, however, that the set of
equilibrium outcomes is usually very large). Our objective in this paper is the analysis of the incentives
for coalition formation, so we will abstract from the possibility of collusion by assuming that production is
a short-term decision. An equivalent assumption is that ﬁrms use Markov, or stationary, strategies when
they decide their production level. In Section 5, we analyze a simpler game in which this assumption is
not necessary because production takes place only once. In this game, all our results still hold.









We study the outcome of a process of sequential coalition formation.T h i s i n ﬁnite-
horizon process is undertaken according to the following protocol. At each period t, there
is ﬁrst the decision to merge (stages t.1 and t.2) and secondly, (stage t.3), there is the
decision on production. We have already described the result of the production stage,
summarized by the proﬁtf u n c t i o nVi(πt). More precisely:
At t =0 :
0.1 Two diﬀerent ﬁrms i and j are randomly selected. All the ﬁrms have the same
probability of being selected.
0.2 Firms i and j sequentially decide whether to merge or not. The merger occurs if
both players agree.
The coalition structure at time t =0is then either π0 =( πn\{{i},{j}}) ∪ {i,j} if
ﬁrms i and j have merged or π0 = πn if they have not.
0.3 Each ﬁrm k ∈ N obtains, at t =0 ,p r o ﬁts Vk (π0).
Let us now consider any time t ≥ 1. The coalition structure existing at t−1 was πt−1.
If πt−1 = N,t h e nπt = N. Otherwise:
t.1 Two coalitions Sa and Sb in πt−1 are randomly selected. All of the coalitions in πt−1
have the same probability of being selected.
t.2 Firms in coalitions Sa and Sb sequentially decide whether to merge. The merger is
carried-out if all of the ﬁrms in coalitions Sa and Sb agree to it.7
The coalition structure at time t is either πt =( πt−1\{Sa,S b})∪{Sa∪Sb} if coalitions
Sa and Sb have merged or πt = πt−1 if they have not.
t.3 Each player k ∈ N obtains proﬁts Vk (πt) at time t.
7The ﬁrms are the players of our game. When they decide on the merger, the members in Sa and Sb
do not face a co-ordination problem because they chose sequentially. Therefore, if it is optimal for all of
them, they will sequentially choose to merge. If the merger is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrms in one of the









The solution concept that we consider is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and we con-
centrate on pure strategies. We denote the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in pure
strategies by SPE.
We must point out that the proposed process for the formation of coalitions is irre-
versible, in the sense that the players cannot dissolve a merger once it has been formed.
Allowing for mergers to split up enlarges the set of possible SPE considerably.
Given the irreversibility of the coalition-formation process, the game will arrive at
a situation in which the existing coalition structure at that speciﬁc period will remain
forever, with probability one. We will refer to such a coalition structure as a ﬁnal coalition
structure or a ﬁnal outcome. If there are SPE strategies that lead to a particular ﬁnal
outcome, then we say that it is an SPE ﬁnal outcome.
3M y o p i c F i r m s
The objective of this paper is to look at the SPE ﬁnal outcomes of the game of sequential
formation of coalitions. The easiest analysis is done in the simple benchmark where
players have a completely myopic behavior. This is equivalent to assuming that δ =0 ,
the case in which we have the static version of our game.
If the players are myopic, the ﬁrms in two coalitions Sa and Sb in partition π will
decide to merge (if they are chosen by the protocol) at any period, if and only if:8
Vi(π) <V i ((π\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb}) for all i ∈ Sa ∪ Sb.
Let us suppose that the coalition structure π is formed by r ≥ 2 coalitions. Then, the
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,
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Let us assume, without loss of generality, that sa ≤ sb. The condition then becomes:
1





8For convention, we make the implicit assumption that a player will only be willing to join a coalition














Note that the previous equation implies sa >s b as long as r ≥ 3, which would be in
contradiction with our hypothesis that sa ≤ sb. Therefore, two coalitions of ﬁrms will
never be interested in merging if they only care about present proﬁts and if there are at
least three existing coalitions in the industry. This is a well-known result in static games
that goes back to Salant et al. (1983). In addition to this, and for the case r =2 , the
previous inequality shows that two coalitions will merge to monopoly if and only if their
sizes are not very diﬀerent. More precisely, the required condition is that sa > (4/5)sb,
for the case sa ≤ sb.
The previous observation implies that if there are at least three ﬁrms in the market,
the only myopic ﬁnal outcome of the game of coalition formation is “all singletons”.T h a t
is, when δ =0no merger will occur.
For low enough discount rates, a ﬁrm is not interested in compensating short-term
loses with long-term gains. Therefore, the myopic ﬁnal outcome will also be the SPE ﬁnal
outcome when the discount parameter δ is low enough. We state this result formally in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If n ≥ 3 and the discount rate δ is low enough, then the only SPE ﬁnal
outcome of the process of sequential coalition-formation in the linear Cournot setting is
that all ﬁrms remain singletons.
Proof. Immediate, after the discussion for the case δ =0 .
4 Forward-Looking Firms
When ﬁrms are forward-looking, they may be interested in merging even if they lose
proﬁts in the short run, if by doing so they anticipate higher proﬁts in the future. A
(non-proﬁtable) merger by two ﬁrms or two coalitions may further other mergers. Hence,
although the initial merging ﬁr m s( o rc o a l i t i o n s )l o s ep r o ﬁts because of the ﬁrst merger,









The following proposition restricts the set of potential SPE ﬁnal outcomes of the
sequential game for any discount rate. It shows that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms will surely not
start merging to end up in a coalition structure with more than one coalition.
Proposition 2 The SPE ﬁnal outcome of the coalition formation game in a Cournot
competition model can only be either a monopoly or “all singletons”.
Proof. W ed ot h ep r o o fb yc o n t r a d i c t i o n .L e tu ss u p p o s et h a tt h eﬁnal outcome is a
coalition structure π formed by r coalitions, with 2 ≤ r ≤ n−1. Denote by Sa and Sb the
last two coalitions that merged, say at period t0, with sa ≤ sb. I nS e c t i o n3 ,w es a wt h a t ,f o r
a ﬁrm i ∈ Sa, if π includes at least 3 coalitions, then Vi(π) >V i((π\{Sa∪Sb})∪{Sa,S b}).
In addition, ﬁrms in Sa w o u l de v e ng e ts t r i c t l yh i g h e rp r o ﬁts if, at any period after t0,
other mergers not involving Sa take place. Therefore, for ﬁrms in Sa, the strategy of
merging with Sb at t0 (leading to the ﬁnal outcome π 6= π1) is strictly dominated by
the strategy of not accepting any merger from t0 on. Therefore, the ﬁrms in Sa have a
proﬁtable deviation. Hence, no SPE strategy proﬁl ec a nl e a dt oaﬁnal outcome with r
coalitions, for 2 ≤ r ≤ n − 1.
Proposition 2 shows that the process of coalition-formation in a linear Cournot model
will only begin if it leads to full integration (monopoly). Otherwise, all of the ﬁrms will
remain singletons. The reason for this result is that no pair of coalitions wants to be the
last to merge (unless the merger leads to a monopoly). In equilibrium, therefore, a merger
c a no n l yh a p p e ni ft h eﬁrms involved anticipate that it will be followed by another, and
yet another, until “the grand coalition” is formed.
We are now interested in ﬁnding out when the SPE ﬁnal outcome of the game of
coalition-formation is a monopoly. We know that a necessary condition for a monopoly
to emerge is that the discount rate should be high enough, since no merger takes place in
equilibrium when the discount rate δ is low enough, as was shown in Proposition 1.
Given Proposition 2, we also know that two coalitions will never merge if there is not
a sequence of unions leading up to full integration. Another necessary condition for the
mergers to arise therefore, is that for every value of r, for 2 ≤ r ≤ n, there must exist a
coalition structure with r coalitions, such that at least two of them obtain smaller proﬁts









The proﬁts of the members of a coalition of size s in a coalition structure with r cartels
are strictly smaller than their proﬁts in a monopoly if:
1






(r +1 ) 2.





(r +1 ) 2
¾
+1 .
Hence, in a partition with r coalitions, a necessary condition for two coalitions to merge
is that the size of each one be at least sr. This necessary condition has to be veriﬁed for
every r ≥ 2.
To formally state the conditions under which a monopoly might be the SPE outcome,
l e tu sd e n o t eb yM ≡ M
n the set of sequences of coalition structures M = {πr}n
r=1 such







b in πr satisfying min{sr
a,s r
b} ≥ sr.
Similarly, for any r◦ =1 ,...,n, we denote by Mr◦ the set of sequences of coalition
structures Mr◦ = {πr}r◦
r=1 such that πr◦ is any partition of N with r◦ coalitions and, for




b}, for some Sr
a and Sr




According to the previous deﬁnition, M1 = {N}. Also, if the sequence {πr}r◦
r=1 ∈ Mr◦,
then {πr}r0
r=1 ∈ Mr0, for any r◦ =1 ,...,n and r0 ≤ r◦.
Proposition 3 For any n, there exists a ¯ δ<1, such that for all δ ≥ ¯ δ, the SPE strategy
proﬁles of the process of sequential coalition-formation satisfy the following properties.
Consider a subgame in which the existing partition πr contains r coalitions:
(a)I fc o a l i t i o n sSa and Sb a r ec h o s e nb yt h em e c h a n i s m ,t h em e r g e rw i l ln o tb ea c c e p t e d
if min{sa,s b} <s r or if (πr\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} does not belong to any sequence of
coalitions in Mr−1.
(b)I fπr belongs to some sequence of coalitions in Mr, there are two coalitions Sa and
Sb in πr, such that the ﬁrms in Sa and Sb accept the merger if they are selected by the
mechanism.









(c)T h eﬁnal outcome will be a monopoly if and only if πr belongs to some sequence of
coalitions in Mr. Otherwise, the ﬁnal outcome will be πr.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction over r.
(r =2 ) Take any subgame where only two coalitions Sa and Sb are left, i.e., π2 = {Sa,S b}.
In such a case, the merger of the two coalitions is N, h e n c ei ti sa l w a y si nM1.
(2.a)I fmin{sa,s b} <s 2,a n yﬁrm in the smallest coalition prefers to stay as a duopoly
rather than become part of a monopoly. Therefore, every SPE involves rejection of the
merger.
(2.b) If π2 belongs to some sequence of coalitions in M2, then min{sa,s b} ≥ s2. All
the ﬁrms in Sa and Sb obtain higher proﬁts by merging. As a consequence, accepting this
merger is the only SPE strategy in this subgame.
(2.c) Immediate, after (2.a)a n d( 2.b).
Hence, the properties (a), (b)a n d( c) hold for all δ ∈ [0,1].
We now make the induction hypothesis that there exists ¯ δ
r−1 < 1, such that for all
δ ≥ ¯ δ
r−1, properties (a), (b), and (c) hold for any r0 <rand for any πr0. We prove that
this induction hypothesis is also satisﬁed for r, where r =3 ,...,n.
(r) Let πr be the existing partition.
(r.a) Suppose that coalitions Sa and Sb in πr have been chosen by the mechanism
and the ﬁrms in these coalitions must decide whether to merge or not. Suppose that
min{sa,s b} <s r. A c c o r d i n gt op r o p e r t y( c) of the induction hypothesis, the ﬁnal outcome
will be either a monopoly or (πr\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} if Sa and Sb merge and δ ≥ ¯ δ
r−1.
Moreover, to reach monopoly it is necessarily the case that πr−1 ∈ Mr−1, hence, the
proﬁts of the ﬁrms in Sa ∪ Sb will be lower than monopoly proﬁts along all the path to
monopoly. In both cases, the ﬁrms of the smallest coalition will obtain lower proﬁts than
in πr. Hence, merging is a strategy that is strictly dominated (for the ﬁrms in the smallest
coalition) by the strategy of never merging from this moment on.
Similarly, let us suppose that the partition (πr\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} does not belong to
any Mr−1 ∈ Mr−1. Then, according to property (c) of the induction hypothesis, the ﬁnal
outcome will be (πr\{Sa,S b})∪{Sa ∪Sb} if Sa and Sb merge and δ ≥ ¯ δ
r−1.O nt h eo t h e r









strategy, but one possibility), they obtain, from this moment on, at least the beneﬁts that
they have under the structure πr. Given that r>2,V i(πr) >V i((πr\{Sa,S b})∪{Sa∪Sb})
f o re i t h e re v e r yﬁrm in Sa or every ﬁrm in Sb. Therefore, here also, merging is not the
optimal strategy for any of the ﬁrms, either in Sa or in Sb.
We have shown, therefore, that property (a) of the induction hypothesis holds for r
as long as δ ≥ ¯ δ
r−1.
(r.b)W en o wp r o v et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa¯ δ
r < 1 such that for δ ≥ ¯ δ
r, if πr belongs to
some Mr ∈ Mr then the strategies of the members of (at least) two coalitions Sa and Sb
in πr will be to accept the merger if they are selected by the mechanism. We do the proof
by contradiction. Suppose that πr belongs to some Mr ∈ Mr but no two coalitions in
πr ever accept the merger when they are selected at t. If this is the case, then the ﬁnal
outcome is πr. Take a pair of coalitions Sa and Sb in πr, such that min{sa,s b} ≥ sr and
(πr\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} belongs to some Mr−1 ∈ Mr−1 (the existence of such a pair
of coalitions is guaranteed by the deﬁnition of Mr). The members of Sa and Sb obtain
strictly higher proﬁts in a monopoly than staying in πr, since min{sa,s b} ≥ sr. Also, a
monopoly is the ﬁnal outcome if (πr\{Sa,S b})∪{Sa∪Sb} is reached, given that it belongs
to some Mr−1 ∈ Mr−1 and property (c) of the induction hypothesis holds. Finally, the
probability that one of the paths leading to monopoly is chosen by the mechanism is one,
since every pair of coalitions has a positive probability of being chosen. Therefore, there
is a ¯ δ
r(Sa,S b,πr) < 1 large enough such that ﬁrms in Sa ∪ Sb strictly prefer to arrive
at a monopoly (at the rhythm according to the SPE strategies) than to stay in Sa and
Sb forever. They will therefore, have incentives to change their strategy and accept the
merger if δ ≥ ¯ δ
r(Sa,S b,πr) < 1.T od ot h ea r g u m e n tf o ra n y(Sa,S b,π r), we take ¯ δ
r as the
maximum between ¯ δ
r−1 and all the (ﬁnite number of) ¯ δ
r(Sa,S b,πr) for all possible pairs
of coalitions (Sa,S b) in any possible coalition structure πr that belongs to some Mr ∈ Mr.
(r.c) is a direct consequence of (r.a), (r.b), and property (c) of the induction hypothesis.
Proposition 3 gives a lot of information about SPE when the discount factor δ is high.
It provides the two main characteristics of the SPE outcome. First, in a SPE strategy
proﬁle, the members of two randomly chosen coalitions will only decide to merge if the









possible to keep the sequence of coalitions in Mr, then at least one pair of coalitions will
decide to merge. The two properties together imply that, if we start from a partition in
some Mr,t h eﬁrms will form coalitions and end up all together.
Hence, from Proposition 3 we can conclude that if the “all singletons” coalition πn
belongs to some sequence M ∈ M, then a monopoly is the ﬁnal outcome. Moreover, a
monopoly can only be reached through sequences in M.
The next natural question is whether the set M that we have identiﬁed exists or not.
To see that it is sometimes empty, it is suﬃcient to verify that it is empty for n =3
or n =4 . The following lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for M to contain some
sequence of coalition structures.
Lemma 1 If n is large enough, then M is non-empty.
Proof. We construct a sequence M = {πr}n
r=1 by starting from “the grand coalition”,




a = n−s2 and s2
b = s2.F o rr =3 ,S 3
a and S3
b are obtained by dividing S2
a in such a way
that s3
a = s2
a − s3 and s3
b = s3.F o r r ≥ 4, we split the largest coalition in πr−1, which
corresponds to the largest coalition of those with the smallest index in πr−1.I n e v e r y
step, the coalition that is divided (ˆ S) is split in such a way that sr
a =
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ S




The proof that the sequence M belongs to the set M when n is large enough is
relegated to the Appendix.
We denote the set of natural numbers for which the set M is non-empty by N.
According to Lemma 1, for a sequence to exist in M, the number of initial players is
crucial. In fact it can be shown that the set N contains all the numbers higher than or
equal to 37.10 Let us explain why starting with a large number of ﬁrms facilitates arriving
at a monopoly. Two coalitions must not be very diﬀerent in size to be willing to merge,
b u tt h i si sar e q u i r e m e n tt ob ef u l ﬁlled throughout the entire sequence of mergers. If, at
any stage all of the coalitions are too similar, when two of them merge they create a great









coalition compared to the others, and the small ones may stop the process by free-riding
on the big one. With many players, there is a way of having coalitions whose sizes are
balanced enough at every stage.
To highlight the previous argument, consider the case of three ﬁrms. In order to reach
“the grand coalition”, a ﬁrm of size 2 has to merge with the a ﬁrm of size 1. This process
will, however, not be completed because the duopoly is very asymmetric. The ﬁrm alone
receives higher proﬁts in the duopoly than the third it would obtain from the monopoly
proﬁts. Consider now, the case n =3 9 . For the same reason as stated before, a sequence
of mergers that leads to a duopoly with a ﬁrm of size 26 and another of size 13 will never
arrive at “the grand coalition”. However, a path yielding a duopoly with ﬁrms of sizes 21
and 18 will eventually end up as a monopoly. In the previous step (a triopoly), two ﬁrms
of sizes 10 and 11, for instance, are not too small and so they prefer to reach “the grand
coalition” than to stay in the triopoly.
The next proposition states the main result of this paper by combining Proposition 3
and Lemma 1. It shows that if n ∈ N and δ is large enough, then the ﬁrms will enter into
a sequential process of forming coalitions that will end up in the creation of a monopoly.
Proposition 4 If n ∈ N, there exists a ¯ δ<1, such that ∀δ ≥ ¯ δ, the ﬁnal outcome of any
SPE of the process of sequential coalition-formation is “the grand coalition”.
Proof. Immediate, after Proposition 3 and Lemma 1
In our coalition-formation game, only the extreme coalition structures, “all singletons”
or “the grand coalition”, can be equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 4 shows that, when
the number of initial players is high enough and these players are patient enough, the
eﬃcient outcome is the only equilibrium outcome. That is, under these two conditions,
the possibility of establishing bilateral agreements sequentially makes the ﬁrms merge in
such a way that they end up being a monopoly.11 This result is in contradiction with
previous results of merger games. Indeed, as we have discussed in the Introduction, “the
grand coalition” is often not an equilibrium (or stable) outcome and, when it is, it is not
the only one.
11At this point it is worth recalling that, in this model, there is no entry of new ﬁrms. If entry was
allowed, this would crucially alter the incentives of the agents to merge. For an analysis of mergers under









For the proof of the result, in particular for the proof of the non-emptiness of the set of
sequences of coalition structures M, we explicitly construct an algorithm that provides a
particular sequence of coalition structures leading to monopoly when the number of ﬁrms
is high enough. The construction is made easy by the property that, in Cournot oligopolies
with linear demand, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm only depend on the number of coalitions in the
structure and the size of the coalition the ﬁrm belongs to. In addition to this, we can
ensure that the SPE path will follow a sequence in M due to the property that players
will only think about making bilateral agreements if they expect to end up all together.
That is, at the coalition structures diﬀerent from the grand coalition (and “all singleton”),
at least one player in a non-singleton coalition is worse-oﬀ than at the beginning of the
process. Although the intuition behind the result is strong, extending the algorithm to
accommodate more general proﬁt functions seems a diﬃcult task.
Contrary to Cournot oligopoly games, there are other economic situations where agents
have short-term incentives to merge. This is the case, for instance, when agents may
agree on the level of public good provision or may reach trade agreements. In all these
cases, the coalition formation process is fostered which can result in the formation of
the grand coalition, even for small number of initial agents. To illustrate the previous
argument, take the public good game of Ray and Vohra (2001). In this game, each player
can be interpreted as a region that invests in pollution abatement that beneﬁts all the
regions. With a quadratic cost function of production of the public good, in the partition












This is a situation with positive externalities, as the Cournot model we are considering in
this paper. However, in contrast with our model, players (as well as coalitions of similar
sizes) have an incentive to merge even if they do not expect further mergers.12 In this
game, it can be checked that the grand coalition is the only SPE outcome when the initial
number of players is small, and players are suﬃciently patient. Figure 2 illustrates this
game for n =5 .
[Insert Figure 2]









Each box in Figure 2 corresponds to each possible step of the game. It includes the vector
of sizes of the coalitions in the partition that exists at this step, as well as the payoﬀ of
each player in each coalition (for instance in the second box, v2 (π)=5indicates that
each player’s payoﬀ in a coalition of size 2 when the other players are singletons is 5).
The arrows indicate the possible SPE paths.
It is easy to check that the only possible SPE outcome apart from monopoly, is a
duopoly of the form (4,1) but, can such a duopoly be a SPE outcome? To reach this
outcome, the only possible path would be one of the form (a)= ⇒ (b)= ⇒ (d)= ⇒ (f).13
H o w e v e r ,w ec l a i mt h a tt h i sc a n n o tb ea nSPE path because if the ﬁrms in the second
two-player coalition in box (d) anticipate that they will end-up in a four-player coalition
(in box (f)), they will never merge. Indeed, any of these two ﬁrms and the ﬁrst two-player
coalition in box (b) have incentives to form a three-player coalition and move to box (c),
since they know that from this point on, the ﬁnal outcome will certainly be the grand
coalition.
5 Comments and Extensions
In this paper, we have shown that when the initial number of ﬁrms is large enough and they
are forward-looking, a sequential process of bilateral agreements will lead to the creation
of a monopoly (“the grand coalition”). In this section, we discuss the main ingredients of
our model by proposing several other processes of gradual agreements and by comparing
our framework with that of Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999). We introduce
modiﬁc a t i o n st h a ta ﬀect the timing of the coalition formation and the production stages,
the graduality of the process, the bilateral nature of the agreements, the protocol that
chooses the candidates for mergers and the exogenous sharing rule.
Possibly, the closest papers to ours are Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), who
also analyze an inﬁnite-horizon sequential game. In their model, payoﬀs are only realized
after the coalitions have been formed. In the coalition formation game previous to the
production, the ﬁrst agent, according to a rule of order, makes an oﬀer to other agents










to join him in a coalition. If all members accept the oﬀer, the partnership is formed
and the partners in the coalition leave the game. The ﬁrst agent in the set of remaining
players then makes a partnership proposal, and the game continues following the same
rule until all of the players have left the game. If someone rejects, he will then have to
make the next proposal. This model applies to general games. For the linear Cournot
game, Bloch (1996) proves that, when players are ex-ante symmetric and the discount rate
is high enough, the coalition structures that result from the stationary symmetric perfect
equilibria in pure strategies contain a coalition whose size is about 80% of the market,
while the other ﬁrms remain isolated. Hence, “the grand coalition” is not formed.
There are three main diﬀerences between the game proposed by Bloch (1996), and by
Ray and Vohra (1999) and our proposal. First, in their analyses, if the oﬀer is accepted,
the coalition leaves the game, while in our approach the coalitions do not leave the game
once they are formed. This is a reasonable assumption and it is essential for our analysis,
as it allows coalitions to be formed gradually over time. In fact, the bilateral process of
coalition formation would make no sense if the pairs formed in one stage could not, later
on, join with others.
The second diﬀerence is that, in the previous papers, production takes place only after
the coalitions have been formed. And thirdly, a player may make an oﬀer to any set of
p a r t n e r s .W en o wd i s c u s st h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h el a s tt w od i ﬀerences, as well as those of
other potential modiﬁcations of the analysis performed.
5.1 Timing of the Production Stage
Our results continue to hold if we consider a game similar to the one described in Section
2 but where production takes place and proﬁts are realized only after the whole process of
coalition formation has ended. This is the framework that most models in the literature
have considered.14
To adapt our model, consider the same protocol for coalition-formation as in Section 2
with the following diﬀerence: At t.3 (for any t ≥ 0) all ﬁrms are asked sequentially whether
to continue with the coalition-formation process (Y), or to move to the production stage









(N); if all the ﬁrms say Y then they go to (t +1 ).1 (they do not obtain proﬁts at t);
otherwise, each player k ∈ N obtains proﬁts Vk (πt) for any period τ ≥ t.T h a t i s ,t h e
formation of coalitions continues only if all the ﬁrms agree to it, any ﬁrm can decide to
end the coalition formation stage and move to the production stage if it wishes. We refer
to this game as “the bilateral coalition formation game with proﬁts at the end”.
Proposition 5 If n ∈ N, there exists a ¯ δ<1, such that ∀δ ≥ ¯ δ, the ﬁnal outcome of any
SPE of the bilateral coalition formation game with proﬁts at the end in a linear Cournot
competition model is “the grand coalition”.
Proof. The proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3. In this case,
it is possible to make a more precise statement in part (b) of that Proposition: Coalitions
Sa and Sb in πr accept the merger if they are selected by the mechanism and if such
decision minimizes the expected losses from discounting. This is the case since all the
ﬁr m ss h a r et h es a m eo b j e c t i v ew h e nt h e yd e c i d ew h e t h e rt om e r g eo rn o t . F i n a l l y ,t h e
players’ strategies when the existing coalition structure is πr, specify that they will decide
to move to the production stage if and only if πr does not belong to any sequence of
coalitions in Mr.
5.2 Protocol
The results in this paper are also robust to other protocols for the choice of the coali-
tions that, at each period, decide whether to merge or not. First, it is clear that, if a
deterministic protocol selects the identity of the two coalitions that can merge, the results
still hold, provided that the protocol is exhaustive in the set of possible couples for each
coalition structure (i.e., all the possible pairs of coalitions in any coalition structure are
called by the protocol at some moment).
The analysis can equally be developed in scenarios where the protocol selects one of
the coalitions, which then has the possibility to oﬀer a merger to any other coalition. To
be more precise, consider the following protocol: At each period t ≥ 0 where πt−1 6= N
(with the obvious small diﬀerences when t =0 ):
t.1 A coalition Sa in πt−1 is randomly selected. All of the coalitions in πt−1 have the









t.2 A (randomly chosen) ﬁrm in coalition Sa selects a coalition Sb ∈ πt−1\Sa.
t.3 Firms in coalitions Sa and Sb sequentially decide whether to merge. The merger is
carried-out if all of the ﬁrms in Sa and Sb agree to it.
The coalition structure at time t is either πt =( πt−1\{Sa,S b})∪{Sa∪Sb} if Sa and
Sb have merged or πt = πt−1 if they have not.
t.4 Each player k ∈ N obtains proﬁts Vk (πt) at time t.
We will refer to coalition Sa as a “leader”.
Proposition 6 If n ∈ N, there exists a ¯ δ<1, such that ∀δ ≥ ¯ δ, the ﬁnal outcome of
any SPE of the bilateral coalition formation game with with a leader in a linear Cournot
competition model is “the grand coalition”.
Proof. It is very similar to the proof for propositions 3 and 4. The main diﬀerence
is that, under the present protocol, the statements (a) and (b) in Proposition 3 are: (a)
If the coalition Sa is chosen by the mechanism, no proposed merger will be accepted
if min{sa,s b} <s r or if (πr\{Sa,S b}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} does not belong to any sequence of
coalitions in Mr−1 for all Sb ∈ πt−1\Sa. (b)I fπr b e l o n g st os o m es e q u e n c eo fc o a l i t i o n si n
Mr, there are two coalitions Sa and Sb in πr, such that, if Sa is selected by the mechanism,
the chosen ﬁrm in Sa will select the coalition Sb, and the ﬁrms in Sa and Sb will accept
the merger.
5.3 Multilateral Agreements
The bilateral nature of the agreements is a key feature of our analysis. The study of
the outcome of a coalition formation game where players have the possibility of forming
coalitions of any size in a single round is not the subject of this paper. However, we suspect
that the results obtained in this paper do not extend to the multilateral case, where
forming coalitions of any size is costless. In particular, suppose that a protocol selects (as
in Subsection 5.2) one of the coalitions which then has the possibility to oﬀer a merger to
any set of coalitions. Contrary to the case with bilateral mergers, a suﬃcient condition









low enough (impatient players).15 The reason is that, in this case, the players’ strategic
capacity to induce a more proﬁtable coalition structure through unions that trigger other
unions is lost, since the players are essentially short-term maximizers. Similarly, it is
easy to check that a monopoly is the unique equilibrium outcome in the linear Cournot
setting when the number of ﬁrms is small. Indeed, when there are less than ﬁve ﬁrms,
at equilibrium, any proposer at the ﬁrst round will always propose the formation of the
grand coalition, and the other ﬁrms will accept the proposal.
5.4 Endogenous Sharing Rule
We have chosen to study the outcomes of a coalition formation procedure when the payoﬀs
of the players, at any moment, depend exclusively on the coalition structure prevailing at
that moment. Indeed, we have assumed an exogenous equal-sharing rule that is indepen-
dent of the history. We could also study the outcomes of a similar procedure allowing for
endogenous sharing rules that would depend on the bargaining power of the coalitions at
the moment when they have to decide whether to merge or not. Although it may seem at
ﬁrst sight that allowing for endogenous sharing rules should help the formation of coali-
tions, since it allows for compensating players in any way, this possibility makes forming
coalitions more diﬃcult. The reason for this is that merging at an early stage lowers the
bargaining power of the players in the continuation of the game. Hence, although the
ﬁnal mergers are easier to implement, the players have no incentive to start the process.
The bilateral and sequential nature of the coalition formation process, avoids beneﬁting
from the greater ﬂexibility that, at least in principle, oﬀers an endogenous sharing rule.
This is in contrast with the multilateral process analyzed by Ray and Vohra (1999). They
show that, in symmetric games, endogeneizing the sharing rule gives the same results as
the exogeneous sharing rule model studied by Bloch (1996).
To be more precise, consider the following variation of our coalition formation game:
Of the two coalitions that have to decide whether to merge or not, one of them is chosen
randomly and must make a proposal to the other concerning the sharing of the surplus.
15A general model of coalition formation with multilateral agreements and endogenous sharing rule
(contrary to our assumption of ﬁxed sharing rule) is provided by Gomes (2003), where he proves that









We refer to this variant as “the bilateral coalition formation game with endogeneous
sharing rule”.
Proposition 7 The SPE ﬁnal outcome of the bilateral coalition formation game with
endogeneous sharing rule in a linear Cournot competition model is that all the players
remain as singletons.
Proof. By an argument similar to the one leading to Proposition 2,i ti se a s yt oc h e c k
that the process of coalition-formation will only begin if it leads to monopoly. We prove,
by contradiction, that the SPE ﬁnal outcome cannot lead to monopoly. First, if a duopoly
is formed, the two coalitions will have incentives to merge, each eventually obtaining an
expected payoﬀ of 1/8, since they share the beneﬁts of the monopoly, i.e., 1/4 (in expected
terms, the possible surplus will be shared equally between the two coalitions). Consider,
now, the moment where (all the players have been merging continually and) the structure
in the market is of three coalitions. The sum of the payoﬀso ft h eﬁr m si ne a c ho ft h e
coalitions is 1/16. But this implies that no two coalitions, say S1 and S2, would have any
incentive to merge: Firms in S1 ( a sw e l la st h eﬁrms in S2) would obtain proﬁts of 1/18 in
t h ed u o p o l ya n de n du pw i t ht h es a m ep r o ﬁts as in their initial situation, that is 1/16.16
Therefore, the monopoly can not be reached and the only possible SPE ﬁnal outcome is
that all players remain as singletons.
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6 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .W ep r o v et h a tt h es e q u e n c eM constructed in the proof of Lemma
1 belongs to M when n is large enough. We do the proof by induction over r.F o re a c hr,





b} ≥ sr. Note that, since the minimum size of a coalition is 1, when sr =1 ,t h e




(r +1 ) 2
¾
=0 , i.e., r>r max(n) ≡
√
4n − 1.
Therefore, we concentrate on r ∈ [2,r max(n)].
(r =2 )m i n {s2
a,s 2
b} ≥ s2 holds if and only if s2











As u ﬃcient condition for the above inequality to hold is n ≥ 18.
(r =3 )Since s3
b = s3, to check if the condition min{s3
a,s 3
b} ≥ s3 is satisﬁed it suﬃces to
check that s3
a = s2






















It can be shown that the above inequality always holds if n ≥ 37.
For any r ≥ 4, the sizes of the coalitions Sr
a and Sr
b sum up to the size of the largest
coalition in πr−1 (denote it ˆ Sr−1). Since sr
b = sr, to check condition min{sr
a,s r
b} ≥ sr, it
suﬃces to verify that sr
a =
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ Sr−1
¯ ¯ ¯ − sr ≥ sr. If we take into account that the size of the
biggest coalition in πr−1 h a st ob ea tl e a s t n




























This inequality holds if:
f(r) ≡
2(r +1 )
2 (r − 1)
(r − 3)
2 ≤ n.
Since the function f(r) is ﬁrst decreasing (from r =4on) and then increasing, the
previous inequality holds for all relevant r if it is satisﬁed at the extreme values r =4and
r = rmax(n). It can be shown that this happens as long as n is large enough. In particular,
this suﬃcient condition holds for every n ≥ 150.
We now provide an algorithm to construct a sequence in M. This algorithm allows to
check that M 6= ∅ for n ∈ {15,22,23,29,30,31,33,34,35}, and for every n ≥ 37. We also
i n c l u d ea ne x a m p l eo ft h ew o r k i n go ft h ea l g o r i t h mw h e nn =1 5 .
Algorithm:
The algorithm creates a sequence of mergers. If the algorithm does not stop in any
iteration t0 ≤ rmax =2
√
n − 1, then the set M is not empty and the sequence created
with the algorithm can be continued until it reaches πn such that M ∈ M.
For any initial number of ﬁrms n, let vr be the vector that represents the sizes of the
coalitions that will be formed at the step r of the algorithm. The vector vr will have r
components that sum up to n. We start from v1 =( n) and deﬁne v1
a = n.






At any iteration t ≥ 1:
1. From the vector vt, take the element vt
















2. Construct vt+1 as a vector with t+1components: All the components vt
i for i 6= a,
v
t+1

















b <s t+1, then stop and the algorithm is unable to produce a sequence in the
set M.I f v
t+1











b ≥ st+1 and t+2≥ rmax then the algorithm is over (since st+2 =1 )a n dt h es e t
M is non-empty.
Example: n =1 5 .r max =6 .745, hence the algorithm has, at most 5 rounds. s2 =7 ,
s3 =4 ,s 4 =3 , s5 =2 ,s 6 =2 ,s t =1 , for all t ≥ 7.
t =1:From v1 =( 1 5 ), deﬁne v2
h =1 5− 7=8and v2
l =7 .
Then v2 =( 8 ,7), and v2
a =8 ,v 2
b =7=s2 and we move to iteration 2.
t =2:From v2 =( 8 ,7), deﬁne v3
h =8− 4=4and v3
l =4 .
Then v3 =( 4 ,4,7), and v3
a =7 ,v 3
b =4=s3 a n dw em o v et oi t e r a t i o n3.
t =3:From v3 =( 4 ,4,7), deﬁne v4
h =7− 3=4and v4
l =3 .
Then v4 =( 4 ,4,4,3), and v4
a =4 ,v 4
b =3=s4 a n dw em o v et oi t e r a t i o n4.
t =4:From v4 =( 4 ,4,4,3), deﬁne v5
h =4− 2=2and v5
l =2 .
Then v5 =( 2 ,2,4,4,3), and v5
a =4 ,v 5
b =2=s5 a n dw em o v et oi t e r a t i o n5.
t =5:From v5 =( 2 ,2,4,4,3), deﬁne v6
h =4− 2=2and v6
l =2 .
Then v6 =( 2 ,2,2,2,4,3), and v6
a =4 ,v 6
b =2=s6 a n dw es t o pt h ea l g o r i t h m .
The outcome of the algorithm indicates how to arrive to the grand coalition when
n =1 5 . Any path that leads to a partition with 6 coalitions of sizes (2,2,2,2,4,3) can
be part of a SPE. From this partition on, the coalitions can follow the inverse path of
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() 1 4,5 V π =  
(2,1,1,1) 
 
() () 21 5; 6,5 VV ππ ==  
(3,1,1) 
 
() () 31 6.5; 10,5 VV ππ ==
 (2,2,1) 
 
() () 21 7; 8.5 VV ππ ==
(3,2) 
 
() () 32 8,5; 11 VV ππ ==  
(4,1) 
 
() () 41 9; 16.5 VV ππ ==
(5) 
 






Figure 2: Public Good game with n =5
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